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I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit decided a case about whether a petitioner for inter
partes review (IPR) could seek judicial recourse after the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office or Agency)
declined to institute the review.1 In that case, In re Power
Integrations, Inc., the court noted that judicial review of the
Agency’s decision was barred by statute,2 and that review under
the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement for a brief
explanation was inapposite to the facts of the case.3 Because the
Agency had provided the petitioner with a detailed explanation for
its decision, the explanation requirement was satisfied.4
But what if the Agency had not provided a detailed explanation
for declining to institute inter partes review? What if the Agency
had given the petitioner no explanation at all about why the
petition was denied or about how to correct any deficiencies?
Unfortunately, a dissatisfied petitioner might have a difficult time
convincing a court to entertain the argument that the Agency must
provide an explanation. Because the Patent Act bars appeals of the
Patent Office’s decisions whether to institute inter partes review,5
courts have been hesitant to touch any issue relating to the
institution decision.
Yet such a course of action by the Patent Office likely would fit
within the category of “shenanigans” that the Supreme Court has
said may be reviewable, despite the appeal bar.6 While a court may
not review the merits of the institution decision,7 this Note argues
that a court may compel a brief explanation from the Agency, as
such recourse is expressly contemplated by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). Despite the Federal Circuit’s rejection of the
petitioner’s APA argument in Power Integrations, the Patent Office
is required to give a brief explanation when it denies petitions for
inter partes review. The APA requires that agencies provide a brief

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

770

In re Power Integrations, Inc., 899 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1318 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012)).
Id. at 1319–20 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2018)).
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (making the IPR institution decision “final and nonappealable”).
See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016).
Power Integrations, 899 F.3d at 1318.
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statement of the grounds for denying a petition.8 That an agency’s
decision to deny a petition is committed to its discretion does not
relieve the agency from the APA’s procedural requirements. Thus,
even though the Patent Office has discretion to deny institution
of inter partes review,9 it must provide an explanation when it
does so.
II. BACKGROUND
The United States Patent and Trademark Office has statutory
responsibility for granting patents.10 The authority and
responsibility of the Patent Office to carry out its duties regarding
patents is derived from Congress’s constitutional power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”11 The statutory powers and
duties of the Patent Office relating to patents are found in the Patent
Act, codified in Title 35 of the United States Code.12 Congress
further defined the role of the Patent Office by passing the LeahySmith America Invents Act in 2011.
As a federal agency exercising executive authority, the Patent
Office is generally subject to the Administrative Procedure Act.13
This means that, except where the Patent Act provides an
exemption from the APA, the Patent Office must meet the APA’s
requirements when it makes rules and carries out adjudications.
Appeals of Patent Office decisions are taken to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over patent matters.14 In some circumstances,
the Patent Act allows suits against the Patent Office in the United

8. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e).
9. The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that the Patent Office’s

decision not to institute inter partes review is committed to agency discretion by law. Cuozzo,
136 S. Ct. at 2140 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) & 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)). This means that the tools
of judicial review provided by the Administrative Procedure Act are generally unavailable
to a dissatisfied petitioner for inter partes review. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (stating that
Chapter 7 of Title 5 “applies . . . except to the extent that . . . agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law”).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 141.
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.15 Appeals
of these suits likewise go to the Federal Circuit.16 Having a single
circuit for patent appeals allows patent law to develop uniformly
throughout the country. As with all other circuit courts, decisions
of the Federal Circuit can be appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States.17
A. The America Invents Act
In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(AIA) into law.18 This Act is widely considered to be the most
substantial change to patent law since 1952.19 A significant feature
of the AIA was the creation of certain adjudicative proceedings that
allow the Patent Office to reevaluate the patentability of an issued
patent. These proceedings, commonly referred to as post-grant
proceedings, are inter partes review,20 post-grant review,21 and
covered business method patent review.22 They are conducted by
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board), which is a subdivision
of the Patent Office.23 Post-grant proceedings have been described
as an attempt by Congress to expedite disputes about a patent’s
validity.24 The most commonly-used of these proceedings is inter
partes review,25 which is the subject of this Note.
Inter partes review is an administrative adjudication
proceeding through which any person other than the owner can

15.
16.
17.
18.

E.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 145, 146, 154(b)(4).
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(C).
28 U.S.C. § 1254.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
as amended primarily in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) [hereinafter AIA].
19. See, e.g., ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY 18 (7th ed. 2017); Renoj Zachariah, Note, Fighting the Troll Toll: The Case for Judicial
Review of the U.S.P.T.O. Director’s Denial of a Petition to Institute an Inter Partes Review, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 2273, 2275 (2017).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 311.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 321.
22. AIA § 18.
23. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(c), 326(c).
24. S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 20 (2008) (“[Post-grant proceedings] will give third parties
a quick, inexpensive, and reliable alternative to district court litigation to resolve questions
of patent validity”).
25. See Eric C. Cohen, A Primer on Inter Partes Review, Covered Business Method Review,
and Post-Grant Review Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 1 (2014/2015)
(noting that as of Aug. 14, 2014, 1614 IPR petitions and 204 CBM petitions had been filed).

772

003.BRIMLEY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

769

3/25/20 9:04 PM

A Shenanigan in IPR Denials

challenge the patentability of a U.S. patent.26 The scope of the
proceeding is limited to grounds of novelty or nonobviousness,
and the prior art that can be asserted against the challenged patent
is limited to other patents and printed publications.27 To seek inter
partes review, a challenger files a petition with the Patent Office
that identifies which claims of the patent it is challenging, and on
what grounds.28 The patentee may file a preliminary response,
giving reasons not to institute the proceeding.29 The Board then
makes a decision whether to institute inter partes review of the
challenged patent.30 If the Board decides to institute the review, the
Board and the parties follow certain procedures, some of which are
defined by statute,31 and others of which are codified as Patent
Office regulations.32 The Board must issue a final written decision
within one year of the institution date.33
B. The Administrative Procedure Act
Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.34
The APA is a statutory scheme that supplies default procedures for
governing administrative agencies’ actions and courts’ review of
those actions.35 It places procedural and substantive restrictions on
how agencies regulate entities within their spheres of influence.36 It
also provides a means whereby dissatisfied parties may seek
redress of grievances with the agencies through judicial review.37
The chapter of the APA on judicial review, Chapter 7 of Title 5,38

26. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). Novelty is a requirement for patentability, and is governed by

35 U.S.C. § 102. Nonobviousness is also a requirement for patentability, and is governed by
35 U.S.C. § 103.
28. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a), 312(a)(3).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 313.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 314.
31. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319.
32. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.1–42.123 (2018).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).
34. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559,
701–706 (2012)).
35. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 305–06 (7th ed. 2016).
36. Id. at 303.
37. See 5 U.S.C. ch. 7 (2018).
38. This Note refers to sections and chapters of the Administrative Procedure Act by
their codified numbers in Title 5 of the United States Code, rather than their numbers in Pub.
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gives details of the availability, timing, form, and scope of such
review.39 A frequently cited provision of that chapter is the
standard that agency action must be set aside by a reviewing court
when the action is arbitrary or capricious.40 Other standards found
in the same section require that agency decisions comply with
constitutional and statutory law, among other things.41
One of the procedural requirements of the APA is that agencies
must provide brief explanations when they deny requested actions,
including adjudication proceedings.42 This requirement allows
courts to compel an agency to provide such an explanation in the
event the agency has failed to do so.
III. THE IPR INSTITUTION DECISION IS NONAPPEALABLE
The Patent Office’s decision whether to institute inter partes
review falls outside of a court’s jurisdiction to review agency action.
Appeal of the decision is barred by the Patent Act, and courts have
made it clear that this bar prevents them from reviewing the merits
of the decision.
A. Appeal of the Patent Office’s IPR Institution Decision
Is Barred by the Patent Act
Statutory authority to institute inter partes review is given to
the Director of the Patent Office.43 The Director has delegated this
authority to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.44 The Board is not
required to institute a review.45 Further, the Patent Act expressly
bars an appeal of the decision to institute inter partes review in
§ 314(d), which says “[t]he determination by the Director whether
to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final
and nonappealable.”46

L. No. 79-404. For example, the section on the scope of judicial review of agency action is
herein § 706 of the APA, rather than section 10(e) of the APA. This practice is common,
though not exclusive, in administrative law. LAWSON, supra note 35, at 306 n.7.
39. LAWSON, supra note 35, at 305–06.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(D).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012).
44. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2018).
45. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d).
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B. The Supreme Court Interprets the Patent Act’s § 314(d)
The Supreme Court has examined the IPR nonappealability
provision of the Patent Act in the context of an inter partes review
that was instituted on grounds other than those sought by the
petitioner.47 In Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, the Board had
instituted inter partes review of certain claims on obviousness
grounds that were not expressly raised by the petitioner.48 The
patentee objected, pointing out that the IPR statute requires a
petition for inter partes review to state “with particularity” the
grounds for challenging the patent.49 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
said that it was precluded from reviewing the Board’s institution
decision because § 314(d) made that decision nonappealable.50 The
petitioner argued that the statute only precluded an interlocutory
appeal, and that the court could review the institution decision as a
review of a final order.51 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument,
pointing out that other sections of the Patent Act already limit
appeals from an inter partes review to consideration of the Board’s
final written decision, a fact that would make § 314(d) nugatory if
interpreted solely to restrict interlocutory appeals.52 The Supreme
Court affirmed, noting that the language of § 314(d) is plain: “the
‘determination by the [Patent Office] whether to institute an inter
partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.’”53
In holding that the Patent Act’s § 314(d) generally bars judicial
review of the Patent Office’s IPR institution decision, the Court left
open the possibility for an appeal on grounds outside of the
institution decision statute.54 Not surprisingly, the Court said that
constitutional questions may establish permissible grounds for
review of the institution decision.55 The Court also said that there
may be questions of statutory rights beyond § 314(d) that would
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016).
Id. at 2138.
Id. at 2139 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)).
Id.
In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 319 & 141(c)).
Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2139 (alteration in original) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 314(d)). Justice
Alito and Justice Sotomayor agreed with the petitioner on this point; they would have held
that § 314(d) precludes only interlocutory appeals. Id. at 2149 (Alito, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
54. Id. at 2141–42 (majority opinion).
55. Id. at 2141.
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allow a court to review the decision. The Court noted that
“constitutional questions,” questions depending on “other less
closely related [to § 314(d)] statutes,” or “questions of
interpretation that reach, in terms of scope and impact, well
beyond” § 314 could possibly be avenues for appeal.56
One important statement from the Court in Cuozzo is its
assertion that the decision of the Director to deny institution of inter
partes review is “a matter committed to the Patent Office’s
discretion.”57 In so asserting, the Court cited the APA’s subsection
on preclusion of judicial review.58 Specifically, the Court pointed to
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), which places agency decisions that are
“committed to agency discretion by law” outside the reach of the
APA’s judicial review provisions.59 The Court reasoned that the
Agency is not required to institute inter partes review in any
circumstance.60 While there is a threshold requirement to institute
review—the Patent Office must first find that “there is a reasonable
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
1 of the claims challenged in the petition”61—there is “no mandate
to institute review” and thus the institution decision is “committed
to [agency] discretion.”62
C. Committed to Agency Discretion by Law
The jurisprudence on the “committed to agency discretion by
law” preclusion doctrine has been described as being “as confusing
as any body of doctrine in administrative law—which is saying
quite a lot.”63 By the APA’s terms, Chapter 7 of Title 5 is not
applicable “to the extent that . . . agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law.”64 This means that the APA’s statutory
provisions that generally direct how agency action will be reviewed
by a court are not available for agency action committed to agency
discretion. These provisions include the APA’s waiver of sovereign

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

776

Id.
Id. at 2140.
Id.
Id.
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140.
LAWSON, supra note 35, at 1003.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2018).
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immunity,65 the general statutory cause of action,66 and the
substantive grounds for compelling or setting aside agency action.67
But as this Note discusses infra, federal courts have held that the
APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is still applicable when
suing an agency for specific relief, even if judicial review is
otherwise unavailable.
Because the Patent Office’s decision to deny a petition for inter
partes review is committed to agency discretion by law, a
dissatisfied petitioner cannot get a court to review the denial under
the arbitrary or capricious standard, or under any other grounds in
APA § 706.68
D. Additional Supreme Court Precedent on the Institution Decision
The Supreme Court has heard two cases of relevance to the
Patent Office’s IPR institution decision since the Cuozzo case.69 In
Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, the
Court reiterated its view from Cuozzo that “[t]he decision whether
to institute inter partes review is committed to the Director’s
discretion.”70 On the same day, the Court issued a companion IPR
decision to Oil States. In SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, the Court did
not use the language “committed to agency discretion,” or any
equivalent.71 At its core, the case was about whether the Patent
Office could institute inter partes review of some, but not all, patent
claims challenged in the petition.72 The Court said no; such “partial
65.
66.
67.
68.

5 U.S.C. § 702.
5 U.S.C. § 704.
5 U.S.C. § 706.
Scholars have debated whether agency action that is committed to its discretion is
nevertheless reviewable under § 706(2)(A)’s “abuse of discretion” standard. Ronald M.
Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 694–95
(1990). The Supreme Court has definitively stated that such action is unreviewable, even
under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 700.
69. At the time of writing this Note, another case is before the Court about whether
the appeal bar in 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) extends to decisions of the Patent Office to institute inter
partes review after determining that the Patent Act’s time bar in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) does not
apply to the case. Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Techs., LP, No. 18-916 (U.S. argued Dec. 9, 2019).
70. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371
(2018) (citing Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016)); see also id.
at 1378 n.5 (“[T]he decision to institute review is . . . committed to [the Director’s]
unreviewable discretion.”).
71. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
72. Id. at 1354. The regulation establishing the Patent Office’s “partial institution”
practice was found at 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2018), now abrogated by SAS Institute.
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institution” runs counter to the plain text of the Patent Act in
§ 318(a), which says the Board “shall issue a final written decision
with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by
the petitioner.”73 The Court interpreted this statute to mean that the
Board must address the patentability of all claims challenged in the
petition. It thus follows that the Board, when instituting review,
must do so for all challenged claims. So, the Director cannot deny
institution on some claims while granting institution on other
claims challenged in the same petition.74
But to say this, the Court had to overcome the argument that it
had no power—because of § 314(d) of the Patent Act—to review the
denial of institution on some of the challenged claims.75 The Court’s
ready answer was that the APA “directs courts to set aside agency
action ‘not in accordance with law’ or ‘in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.’”76 Since partial institution
was not in accordance with § 318(a) of the Patent Act, the APA gave
the Court power to set aside the Patent Office’s regulation that
established the partial institution practice.
SAS Institute’s use of the Administrative Procedure Act in the
IPR institution decision context and Cuozzo’s language that the IPR
non-institution decision is “committed to the Patent Office’s
discretion”77 can be reconciled. Cuozzo explained,
Nevertheless, in light of § 314(d)’s own text and the
presumption favoring review, we emphasize that our
interpretation applies where the grounds for attacking the
decision to institute inter partes review consist of questions that
are closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes
related to the Patent Office’s decision to initiate inter partes
review. . . . This means that we need not, and do not, decide the
precise effect of § 314(d) on appeals that implicate constitutional
questions, that depend on other less closely related statutes, or
that present other questions of interpretation that reach, in terms
of scope and impact, well beyond “this section.”78

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

778

35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2012); SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1354.
SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1358.
Id. at 1359.
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (2018)).
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016).
Id. at 2141 (citation omitted).
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In other words, SAS Institute’s use of the APA to require the
Patent Office to institute inter partes review (if at all) on all
challenged claims must be read as looking well beyond § 314. In
light of SAS Institute and Cuozzo, the final decision statute in § 318
of the Patent Act must have a scope and impact well beyond the
institution statute in § 314. Alternatively, § 318’s requirement of
addressing all challenged claims in the final written decision is less
closely related to § 314 than the statute at issue in Cuozzo. That
statute was § 312 of the Patent Act, requiring that the petition for
inter partes review be “pleaded ‘with particularity.’”79
Last, the Cuozzo Court had noted that “shenanigans” of the
Patent Office acting “outside its statutory limits” would allow a
court to review the action under the APA in an appeal.80 The Court
reiterated this point in SAS Institute.81
E. The Federal Circuit Applies the Patent Act’s § 314(d)
The Federal Circuit has stated that the Patent Act’s bar to
appealing the IPR institution decision in § 314(d) applies equally
well to decisions to deny institution of inter partes review as it
applies to decisions to grant institution.82 In In re Power Integrations,
Inc., the court applied the Cuozzo holding in a case where the Patent
Office had supplied detailed written explanations for its denials of
institution of inter partes review.83 The Agency had issued four
written decisions, each between fifteen and twenty pages,
explaining why institution was not merited in that case.84 These
non-institution decisions thus met the APA’s requirement—found
at 5 U.S.C. § 555(e)—to provide a brief statement of the grounds for
denying the petition for inter partes review.85 The Federal Circuit
denied a petition for a writ of mandamus to have the Patent Trial
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 2142.
Id. at 2141–42.
SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1359.
In re Power Integrations, Inc., 899 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Cuozzo,
136 S. Ct. at 2140). The Federal Circuit’s reading of Cuozzo on this point appears flawed,
because it conflates agency decisions that are “committed to agency discretion by law” and
agency decisions for which “statutes preclude judicial review.” See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). The end
result is the same, however, because both conditions lead to the unavailability of Chapter 7
of Title 5.
83. Id. at 1320.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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and Appeal Board reconsider its denials, evaluate certain evidence
that the petitioner alleged the Board had not adequately weighed,
and “provide an adequate explanation for its non-institution
decisions” as required by § 555(e).86 The court pointed out that the
statute prohibits judicial review of the substance of the Board’s
decision, and asserted that asking for mandamus was just an
attempt to bypass the statutory prohibition of review.87
The court’s rejection of the petitioner’s § 555(e) argument in
Power Integrations can fairly be viewed as saying that the
explanations provided by the Board in that case satisfied the
requirement of § 555(e), rather than that § 555(e) does not apply to
the institution decision. Because the Patent Office had provided
detailed explanations for its denial of a petition, there was nothing
more for § 555(e) to do.
In an earlier case, St. Jude Medical, Cardiology Division, Inc. v.
Volcano Corp., the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal of the Patent
Office’s non-institution decision.88 The court pointed out that the
Patent Act authorizes appeals of IPR cases to the Federal Circuit
only after the Board has issued a “final written decision.”89 A noninstitution decision is not a “final written decision” within the
meaning of the IPR statutes.90 In such cases, inter partes review has
not been instituted and conducted, two conditions contemplated by
the final decision statute in § 318(a) of the Patent Act.91
Furthermore, the court noted that the statute expressly bars an
appeal of the institution decision.92 The court speculated, but did
not decide, that review by any route may be precluded by § 314(d).93
The Federal Circuit has since treaded more carefully with such
speculation; in Power Integrations, the court noted possible avenues
for appellate review or mandamus, citing the possibilities that
Cuozzo left open, including “constitutional issues, issues involving

86. Id. at 1319–21.
87. Id.
88. St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir.

2014).
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

780

Id. at 1375 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012)).
Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)).
Id. at 1375–76.
Id. at 1376 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(d)).
Id.

003.BRIMLEY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

769

3/25/20 9:04 PM

A Shenanigan in IPR Denials

questions outside the scope of section 314(d), and actions by the
agency beyond its statutory limits.”94
IV. SECTION 555(E) OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT IS
APPLICABLE TO THE PATENT OFFICE’S NON-INSTITUTION DECISION
As noted above, the Supreme Court has invoked the
Administrative Procedure Act as a basis for correcting the Patent
Office’s practice of “partial institution” of inter partes review.95 In
the Court’s reasoning in SAS Institute, the partial institution
practice was counter to the Patent Act’s requirement in § 318(a) of
providing a final decision on any challenged claim.96 Therefore, the
APA’s requirement in § 706(2) that agency action accord with
law was apropos for overturning the Patent Office’s partial
institution practice.97
It is interesting that the Court did not hesitate to use § 706 of the
APA to review a Patent Office action (the partial institution
practice) in a context related to the decision of whether to institute
inter partes review, despite the decision being unappealable and
committed to agency discretion. This indicates that there can be
scenarios in which a statute not “closely related” to the institution
statute, § 314, can be invoked while seeking review of a Patent
Office action in a context that is related to institution.
The APA’s § 555(e) is such a statute.
A. What Does the Administrative Procedure Act Generally Require?
The Supreme Court in SAS Institute said that “agency action
‘not in accordance with law’ or ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations’” can be set aside pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act.98 This language is found in the
APA’s section on the scope of judicial review of agency action.99
That section provides additional grounds for setting aside agency
action, including action that is “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

In re Power Integrations, Inc., 899 F.3d 1316, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359 (2018).
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1359.
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (2018)).
5 U.S.C. ch. 7.
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of discretion,”100 “contrary to constitutional right,”101 “short of
statutory right,”102 and “without observance of procedure required
by law.”103 These additional grounds were cited by the Supreme
Court in Cuozzo as possible means to review a Patent Office action
related to the IPR institution decision.104
In addition to complying with these standards under which a
court generally may set aside agency action, an agency must follow
certain procedures required by statute. The APA provides a default
set of procedures for agency actions.105 One such procedure is the
requirement of § 555(e) that an agency provide a brief explanation
for denying a petition.106 This requirement can be another possible
ground for asserting that the Patent Office has not followed the law,
under circumstances where the Agency denies a petition and fails
to provide an explanation for its decision.
Admittedly, the requirement of § 555(e) is “modest.”107
Nevertheless, it is a statutory requirement, and the Patent Act does
not indicate that Congress intended to exempt the Patent Office
from it.
B. Does the Patent Act Foreclose a Remedy
Under the Administrative Procedure Act’s § 555(e)?
The fact that the Patent Act bars an appeal of the Patent Office’s
IPR institution decision might seem to indicate there is also no
remedy under the APA when a petitioner is unsatisfied with a
decision not to institute review and when the Patent Office has not
explained its denial. Indeed, there are two reasons the APA might
be unavailable as a litigation tool in this context. First, the Patent
Act expressly states that the decision is “final and
nonappealable.”108 This fits within the APA’s removal of its judicial
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016).
E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2018). The Supreme Court has held that this section constitutes
the extent of the APA’s procedural requirements for informal adjudications. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655–56 (1990).
106. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e).
107. In re Power Integrations, Inc., 899 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Roelofs
v. Sec’y of Air Force, 628 F.2d 594, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
108. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012).
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review tools when a statute “preclude[s] judicial review.”109
Second, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Patent Office’s
authority to deny institution of inter partes review as “a matter
committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”110 This categorization
would remove the APA’s judicial review tools from review of
denials based on the APA’s clause covering “agency action [that] is
committed to agency discretion by law.”111
But these potential barriers to judicial review in the context of
an IPR denial should not apply when a petitioner is only seeking
an explanation for the denial. A petitioner for inter partes review
who does not receive an explanation from the Patent Office for a
denial should be able to successfully appeal on the basis of the
Agency’s failure to briefly state the grounds for the denial. A failure
to state the grounds for a denial is logically distinct from the
decision itself to deny the petition. Under this theory, the
APA’s standards for judicial review would apply in full force to the
explanation requirement of § 555(e), even though the decision
is unreviewable.
An alternative route for a dissatisfied petitioner is to ask a court
to compel the Agency to provide a brief explanation for the denial
as a matter of legal right. That is, the petitioner would sue the Patent
Office to get the explanation. But this path would be complicated
by the APA’s preclusion clauses.
1. Is judicial review of the decision whether to institute inter partes
review precluded by statute, or is the decision “committed to agency
discretion by law”?
Section 701(a)(1) of the APA makes Chapter 7 of Title 5 (the
judicial review chapter) inapplicable to an agency decision “to the
extent that . . . statutes preclude judicial review.”112 This is intuitive;
how could standards intended for judicial review apply when
judicial review is precluded in the first place? The Patent Act’s
§ 314(d) seems to provide just such a preclusion by making the IPR
institution decision “final and nonappealable.”113 This alone would
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1).
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016).
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1).
35 U.S.C. § 314(d).
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be enough to make the APA’s Chapter 7 standards inapplicable to
the institution decision. But the Supreme Court has reinforced—
arguably unnecessarily—Chapter 7’s unavailability to the IPR
denial decision by invoking in Cuozzo the committed to agency
discretion language.
In Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, the Supreme Court
noted that the Patent Office’s decision to deny a petition for inter
partes review is “committed to the Patent Office’s discretion,”
citing § 701(a)(2).114 Just like § 701(a)(1), the APA’s § 701(a)(2)
forecloses the use of the judicial review tools for reviewing
agency actions that are deemed “committed to agency discretion
by law.”115
It is worth pointing out that the Supreme Court has made an
effort to give both clauses of § 701(a) effect, meaning that
“committed to agency discretion by law” is necessarily a status that
does not stem from a statute making the agency decision
unreviewable.116 So if the Court’s language in Cuozzo about
§ 701(a)(2) of the APA is consistent with prior Court precedent,
then an IPR non-institution decision is not unreviewable because of
the appeal bar in the Patent Act’s § 314(d), but rather because the
Patent Act does not require the Patent Office to institute inter partes
review in any given case.117 In other words, a non-institution
decision is “committed to agency discretion by law” because the
Patent Office may deny inter partes review for any reason.118 This
is in contrast with a decision to grant institution, for which the
Patent Office must first find that there is a “reasonable likelihood”
that at least one claim challenged will be found unpatentable.119 So
for decisions to grant a petition for inter partes review, institution
is not “committed to agency discretion.” But these decisions
squarely fall within the Patent Act’s § 314(d) appeal bar. Of course,
the end result is the same; Chapter 7 of the Administrative
Procedure Act does not apply to the institution decision, whether
the justification falls under § 701(a)(1) or under § 701(a)(2).
114.
115.
116.
117.

Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
See Levin, supra note 68, at 700 n.50.
See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)) (noting there is “no mandate
to institute review”).
118. See id.
119. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).

784

003.BRIMLEY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

769

3/25/20 9:04 PM

A Shenanigan in IPR Denials

2. Does either status foreclose § 555(e) arguments?
An agency decision that is “committed to agency discretion by
law,”120 or for which judicial review is precluded, should not be
immune to the APA’s general requirement that the agency provide
a brief explanation for denying a petition. Although Chapter 7 of
Title 5 is foreclosed by its own terms to a court reviewing such an
agency decision, the other APA provisions remain available. Thus,
because § 555(e) is found in Chapter 5 of Title 5, rather than Chapter
7, it is not foreclosed—at least according to the plain text of
§ 701(a)—for those agency actions that are made unreviewable by
statute or that are “committed to agency discretion by law.”121
Even if the Patent Office has absolute discretion to deny
institution of inter partes review (which it does), including denying
a completely meritorious petition (which it can), the Patent Office
must still give reasons for its denial. In other words, the Patent
Office does not have discretion to not explain its decision
denying institution.
Admittedly, this proposition is disputed by some judges. For
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
has held that the APA’s § 555(e) does not apply to an agency
decision for which there is no right of review available to the
plaintiff.122 The court reasoned that the purpose of § 555(e) is “to
allow a reviewing court to assess the agency’s decision,” and that
when there is no right of review available, a plaintiff suffers no
prejudice “that would entitle them to relief.”123 In other words, the
Tenth Circuit views the explanation required by § 555(e) as an aid
only to a court reviewing an agency’s decision.
But other courts have found more purposes behind § 555(e).
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has
noted that the APA’s requirement for a brief statement of the
grounds for denying a petition not only aids a reviewing court, but
also “ensures the agency’s careful consideration” of petitions, and
allows a petitioner to inform the agency “of any errors it may
have made.”124
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
Id.
High Country Citizens All. v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 1177, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Tourus Records, Inc. v. DEA, 259 F.3d 731, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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Some judges have expressly opined that § 555(e) does create a
legal requirement for an agency to provide a brief statement of
grounds for denying a petition, even when the underlying decision
is not reviewable. In one case, the U.S. Board of Parole had
appealed a district court order that required the Board to provide
written reasons for denying parole applications.125 Concurring with
the majority, Judge Leventhal said that “[the APA]’s procedural
provisions for notice, opportunity to make a presentation, and a
brief statement of reasons apply even where the action is fully
‘committed to agency discretion’ and thus not judicially
reviewable.”126 The court affirmed that the Parole Board must
provide written reasons for denying applications for parole, but
reached that result on constitutional grounds.127 Judge Leventhal
concurred in the result, but noted that he would have decided the
case on statutory grounds under the APA.128 He argued that
§ 555(e) applies even without Chapter 7 because the Parole Board
“does not have discretion to withhold a statement of reasons
for denying parole,” even if the decision itself is committed to
agency discretion.129
In another case, then-Justice Rehnquist said that the statement
of reasons requirement under the APA is independent of the
availability of judicial review.130 In that case, the Supreme Court
ruled that an agency-specific statute required an explanation,
which the agency had not adequately given.131 Justice Rehnquist
reached that result as well, but under the APA.132 In addition, the
lower court in that case had noted that one of the reasons for
§ 555(e), “assuring careful administrative consideration” of an
agency decision, “would be relevant even if the [agency’s] decision
were unreviewable.”133
In addition to some judges—who were well versed in
administrative law—asserting that § 555(e) applies even for agency
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Childs v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1288 n.8 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
Id. at 1279 (opinion of the court).
Id. at 1288 n.8 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
Id.
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 593–94 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
result in part and dissenting in part).
131. Id. at 573 (majority opinion).
132. Id. at 593–94 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).
133. Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 88 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974), rev’d, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
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decisions that are unreviewable, at least one scholar has argued the
same.134 While discussing “reviewable” issues in the context of
otherwise-unreviewable agency action, Ronald Levin says that
“[a]t a minimum, courts presumably may enforce the APA’s
requirement that an agency’s denial of a request to commence
a proceeding be accompanied by a ‘brief statement of the grounds
for denial.’”135
Though there is debate over whether the APA’s § 555(e) applies
to agency decisions that are unreviewable, courts should err on the
side of requiring brief explanations from agencies because doing so
will increase the thoughtfulness of agency decisions and
consequently advance the development of rational legal rules. In
patent law, requiring the Patent Office to provide explanations
when it denies petitions for inter partes review will increase the
patent bar’s collective knowledge of how the requirements for
patentability are applied by the Patent Office. This in turn will
increase the quality of representation before the Patent Office
generally and allow for more efficient resolution of disputes during
inter partes review specifically.
V. SEEKING JUDICIAL REDRESS
WHEN NO EXPLANATION IS PROVIDED
In the previous Part, this Note argues that a dissatisfied
petitioner for inter partes review has a legal right under § 555(e) of
the Administrative Procedure Act to receive a brief explanation
from the Patent Office for its non-institution decision. But there is
also a question of whether the petitioner will be able to secure a
remedy for that legal right. The petitioner will likely face some
hurdles persuading a court to grant redress.
As part of the justiciability requirement of standing, an IPR
petitioner must establish that a concrete legal injury resulted from
not receiving an explanation.136 The petitioner must also have a
recognized cause of action to pursue.137 Another important
consideration is the choice of venue in which to pursue the action.138
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Levin, supra note 68, at 762.
Id.
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3) (allowing a court to dismiss a case for improper venue).
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That choice may depend on the particular cause of action pursued.
Next, the petitioner must demonstrate that the government has
waived sovereign immunity to allow the suit. Finally, even if the
petitioner surpasses all justiciability and procedural hurdles, a
court might hesitate to exercise power over the Patent Office due to
a line-drawing problem: At what point does compelling the Patent
Office to supply an explanation for a denial become a front for
reviewing the Office’s decision? This Note addresses each of these
concerns in turn.
A. Is There a Concrete Injury?
Receiving a brief explanation for a denial of a petition for inter
partes review is more than just procedural fairness. An explanation
actually aids the petitioner in addressing problems with the
petition and pursuing a different course of action going forward.
For example, petitioners may request the Board reconsider a
petition after the Board has decided not to institute the inter partes
review.139 If the initial petition for inter partes review is denied
without explanation, the petitioner lacks key information to correct
legal deficiencies that the original petition may have had.
In addition to the possibility of requesting a rehearing by the
Board, the petitioner can simply file new petitions with a narrower
challenge to the patent.140 This scenario was contemplated by the
Supreme Court in SAS Institute.141 The Court did not address
whether simply repetitioning would comply with the IPR statutes,
but recognized that it might be a way for the Patent Office to
achieve increased efficiency.142 The Patent Office could, for
example, inform the petitioner that the petition was overbroad in
certain claim challenges, and that it might entertain a narrower
scope in a new petition.
One of the points made by the dissent in SAS Institute was that
such back-and-forth between the Patent Office and the petitioner
would be unnecessarily wasteful. In theory, the Board could deny

139. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2018).
140. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) (2012) (providing that a petitioner is estopped from

pursuing additional proceedings with respect to a particular claim after the Board issues a
final written decision in an inter partes review of that claim).
141. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 n.* (2018).
142. Id.
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a petition and notify the petitioner that it did not think much of
some of the challenges made in the petition, but that if the petitioner
refiled with a narrower focus, the Board would reconsider the
petitioner’s challenge to the patent.143 The dissenting Justices
viewed this possibility as a waste of time when, in their opinion, it
was lawful for the Patent Office to institute partial review (the
practice at issue in SAS Institute). Justice Ginsburg had strong
words for such a result: there is no reason “to believe Congress
wanted the Board to spend its time so uselessly.”144
The Justices in the majority did not address whether it would
be legally problematic for the Patent Office to hint to a petitioner
which claims challenged and grounds asserted in the petition were
most plausible.145 They pointed out that if such a tactic is compliant
with the Patent Act, it gives the Patent Office a lawful means of
achieving the effect of partial institution.146
This point supports the policy of requiring the Patent Office to
provide explanations for its non-institution decisions. The Patent
Office is likely to view SAS Institute’s holding—requiring
institution of inter partes review on all challenged claims—as an
added burden. This might incentivize the Patent Office to increase
its denial rate—thus increasing the number of injuries to
petitioners—to offset the increased burden. While the Patent Office
has the legal discretion to do just that, it ought to provide detailed
explanations of the denials so that petitioners can assess whether
they should petition again with fewer challenges. Doing so would
serve to mitigate the injuries petitioners face when they would
otherwise lack understanding of the Agency’s denials.
B. What Cause of Action Should Be Used?
Of course, the potential injury a petitioner would face by not
receiving an explanation for a denial would be redressable only if a
court could compel the Patent Office to provide the explanation.
One critical procedural consideration in pursuing an explanation
for a non-institution decision through the courts is what cause of
action to use. Potential causes of action are a suit under the
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 1360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1358 n.* (majority opinion).
Id.
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Administrative Procedure Act, an appeal from the Agency’s
decision, a petition for a writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act,
and a suit in the nature of mandamus. Each of these potential routes
requires that the petitioner successfully distinguish the soughtafter explanation from the Patent Office’s actual decision of noninstitution, as the decision itself is made nonappealable by § 314(d)
of the Patent Act.147
To the first possible cause of action, if a petitioner successfully
distinguishes the Patent Office’s decision not to institute review
from the Office’s failure to provide the required explanation for its
decision, there is a viable argument that the APA’s judicial review
provisions would then apply to the failure to provide the
explanation. Under this theory, the petitioner could sue the Patent
Office in district court for an explanation. In this case, the petitioner
would not be appealing the Office’s decision not to institute, but
instead would be asserting a right to a brief explanation for the
denial through the general review provisions of the APA.
Alternatively, and to the second possible cause of action, the
petitioner might appeal to the Federal Circuit. Under the
“shenanigans” rule from Cuozzo148—reinvoked by the Supreme
Court in SAS Institute149—the appellate court could hear the appeal
by treating the Agency’s failure to explain its denial as a
“shenanigan” that violates the APA’s explanation requirement.
The court might agree that § 555(e) of the APA is “less closely
related” to § 314 of the Patent Act and that it provides grounds for
appellate review.
To the third possible cause of action, mandamus could
potentially provide relief for a violation of § 555(e) of the APA.
Under the All Writs Act, a court can issue a writ “necessary or
appropriate in aid of [its] respective jurisdiction[].”150 This statute
indicates that issuance of a writ of mandamus could be proper—by
a district or appellate court—when the court otherwise has
jurisdiction over the matter before it. But the All Writs Act does not
itself confer jurisdiction.151 Accordingly, the petitioner for the writ

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
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35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012).
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016).
SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1359.
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).
Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33 (2002).
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must cite another statute that grants subject matter jurisdiction to
the court, or else the court will be powerless to exercise the writ.152
To the fourth possible cause of action, a more plausible choice
for mandamus in an unexplained non-institution situation is an
action filed in district court under the Mandamus Act.153 Unlike the
All Writs Act, the Mandamus Act does confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the district courts, stating “[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus
to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”154 This cause of
action would seem to be a suitable choice for an IPR non-institution
decision that goes without a statement of explanation, so long as
the requirements for mandamus can be satisfied. But these
requirements are quite stringent.
There are three requirements that a petitioner for a writ of
mandamus must satisfy in order to merit an issuance of the writ.155
First, there must be no adequate alternative through legal channels
to obtain the remedy sought.156 Second, the petitioner must
demonstrate that its right to the writ is “clear and indisputable.”157
Third, the court issuing the writ must find that it “is appropriate
under the circumstances.”158
The first requirement that there be no adequate alternative
appears fairly straightforward to satisfy if there is no explanation
for a non-institution decision: but for the court’s compulsion on the
Agency, the petitioner will not receive the required explanation.
The second and third requirements, however, are more tenuous.
The fact that reasonable minds can disagree whether the APA’s
§ 555(e) applies to agency decisions committed to agency discretion
indicates that the right to the writ might not be clear and
indisputable. Mandamus is an action for ministerial duties, rather
than for discretionary acts.159 If the action is discretionary, then
mandamus will not be granted.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1361.
Id.
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004) (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)).
Id. at 381 (citation omitted).
Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984).
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Furthermore, mandamus requires that the remedy be clearly
appropriate to the circumstances. A court might find that
mandamus in an IPR non-institution case is not appropriate under
the circumstances for policy reasons of maximizing efficiency at the
Patent Office and deferring to the Office’s decisions about its
capacity to take on more inter partes reviews.
In re Power Integrations, Inc. provides an example in which the
Federal Circuit dealt with a mandamus petition after the Patent
Office denied petitions for inter partes review.160 The petitioner
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Patent Office to
reconsider its non-institution decisions.161 The cause of action that
the petitioner used was the All Writs Act.162 The petitioner
specifically asked the court to instruct the Patent Office to provide
a reasoned decision after considering all the evidence and applying
correct legal standards.163 The petitioner invoked the APA, § 555(e),
as the basis on which the court could so instruct.164 But in that case,
the Patent Office had not only provided explanations for its
decisions, those explanations were “detailed.”165 This fact left
§ 555(e) with nothing more to do; the low bar of a “brief statement
of the grounds for denial” had been met. The court saw the petition
for a writ of mandamus as a request to review the Patent Office’s
decisions on the merits.166 This request, the court observed, was
“just the camel’s nose under the tent.”167 The Agency’s explanations
were sufficient to inform the petitioner of the Agency’s reasoning,
and anything more would necessarily be a review of the merits of
the decisions.168

160. In re Power Integrations, Inc., 899 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
161. Id. at 1316–17.
162. Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the Dir. of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office

at 1, Power Integrations, 899 F.3d 1316 (No. 18-00147). Strangely, the petitioner cited 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 as the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, without providing an independent
jurisdictional ground for the mandamus petition. Id.
163. Power Integrations, 899 F.3d at 1319.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1320.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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C. What Venue Would Be Proper?
Next, an important procedural consideration for a dissatisfied
IPR petitioner seeking an explanation for a denial is where to bring
the cause of action. If the proper cause of action to pursue is an
appeal, then the proper venue would be the Federal Circuit, which
is the court with jurisdiction to hear appeals from inter partes
review proceedings.169 One obstacle that the petitioner would face
in appealing the Patent Office’s choice not to provide an
explanation for its decision is that there has not been an inter partes
review. By definition, a non-institution decision means that inter
partes review was never instituted. Therefore, there arguably is
nothing to appeal, at least as far as the Federal Circuit’s appellate
jurisdiction over inter partes reviews can reach.
If the cause of action pursued by the petitioner is a suit against
the Agency under the Administrative Procedure Act, then the
proper venue would be a district court. Assuming that Chapter 7 of
the APA applies, the proper venue under § 703 is “a court of
competent jurisdiction.”170 This is most likely the Eastern District of
Virginia because that is the venue where the Patent Office
resides and where other patent statutes assign suits against the
Patent Office.171
If the proper cause of action is in the nature of mandamus, then
a petitioner could try either the Federal Circuit or a district court.
The district court is arguably the best choice because the
Mandamus Act gives the district courts “original jurisdiction of any
action in the nature of mandamus to compel . . . any agency [of the
United States] to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”172 This
statute is thus a grant of subject matter jurisdiction and a provision
of a cause of action.
Alternatively, the petitioner could try getting mandamus at a
district court or the Federal Circuit under the All Writs Act.173 But
this statute does not provide a grant of jurisdiction, so the petitioner
would need to independently establish subject matter jurisdiction.
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (2012).
170. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2018).
171. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (civil action to obtain patent); 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(4)(A) (civil action

to challenge determination of patent term adjustment).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

793

003.BRIMLEY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/25/20 9:04 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2019

The most likely independent basis for jurisdiction would be 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A), but that jurisdictional basis may be
inadequate on its terms; it is for appeals from the Board’s decision
with respect to inter partes review.174 If the petitioner argues that
this provides a basis to come before the court about the noninstitution decision’s missing explanation, the court might view the
language of § 1295(a)(4)(A) as contemplating that an appeal may
not arise after a non-institution decision. After all, the Patent Act
states that the Director makes the decision to institute, not
the Board.175 Even though the Director has delegated by regulation
that institution authority to the Board,176 the statutory scheme
might not allow the Federal Circuit to take an appeal arising
from a procedural posture in which inter partes review has not
been instituted.
For this reason, likely the best option for a dissatisfied petitioner
is filing an action in the nature of mandamus in the Eastern District
of Virginia to compel the Patent Office to provide the needed brief
statement of the grounds for denying the IPR petition.
D. Can the Patent Office Assert Sovereign Immunity?
Yet another hurdle that a petitioner must overcome is sovereign
immunity. As an agency of the United States Government, the
Patent Office is immune from suit unless Congress has
waived immunity for a particular cause of action. A plaintiff must
provide a waiver statute to overcome an agency’s defense of
sovereign immunity.177
For suits under the APA’s general cause of action, a waiver of
sovereign immunity is provided in § 702.178 However, there is a
question whether the APA’s waiver can apply for suits over an
agency decision committed to agency discretion by law. Section 702
says that it does not “affect[] other limitations on judicial review.”179
Additionally, this waiver of sovereign immunity is in Chapter 7 of

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
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5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018).
Id.

003.BRIMLEY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

769

3/25/20 9:04 PM

A Shenanigan in IPR Denials

Title 5, which on its face does not apply to agency actions
committed to agency discretion by law.180
Perhaps surprisingly, federal courts have generally held that
the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity applies to review of
agency action, even when the review does not arise under the APA
itself. For example, the D.C. Circuit has “‘repeatedly’ and
‘expressly’ held in the broadest terms that ‘the APA’s waiver of
sovereign immunity applies to any suit whether under the APA or
not.’”181 In another example, the Federal Circuit said “[w]e hold
that section 702 of the APA waives sovereign immunity for nonmonetary claims against federal agencies, subject to the limitations
in subsections (1) and (2). It is not limited to ‘agency action’ or ‘final
agency action,’ as those terms are defined in the APA.”182
Applying the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity in an action
to compel the Patent Office to provide a brief explanation for its IPR
non-institution decision is consistent with the waiver’s limit that it
only apply in cases where specific relief, rather than monetary
relief, is sought.183
E. What About the Line-Drawing Problem?
Assuming that the right to the explanation is clear, and a proper
venue and cause of action can be found, a court still might hesitate
to grant the remedy that a dissatisfied IPR petitioner seeks.
Requiring the Patent Office to explain its denial, even if only briefly,
creates a line-drawing problem: When does review of the
explanation turn into review of the decision? In other words, what
should a brief statement look like? If the Agency provided no
explanation whatsoever, then the case is simple: the court compels
the Agency to give a brief explanation. But what happens if the
Agency did give some written reason?
Suppose the Board were to give a brief statement of its reasons
for denying a petition, but that the statement was not a “detailed
explanation” like in Power Integrations. For example, what if the

180. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
181. Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 591, 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Trudeau

v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
182. Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 655 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
183. See Dep’t of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 262 (1999).
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Agency wrote, “Your petition for inter partes review is denied
because the time required to address the petition was needed by
the Board to go out to lunch”? This hypothetical reason obviously
would not be contemplated by the statutory scheme that bases inter
partes review on novelty and nonobviousness considerations. It is
easy to say that such an explanation would really be no explanation
at all. But would a court be overstepping its bounds—into territory
of reviewing the decision itself—by requiring the Patent Office to
give something more?
As another example, what if the Patent Office issued a noninstitution decision that read, “The petition for inter partes review
is denied because it did not present a reasonable likelihood that the
challenged claims are unpatentable on novelty or nonobviousness
grounds.” This second example lacks legal analysis. It is simply a
conclusion that references the legal standard for institution. Would
such a conclusory statement be sufficient to meet the modest APA
explanation requirement? Reasonable minds may differ. Some
would say that the lack of analysis and reasoning makes the
explanation pointless. Others might say that the explanation
adequately meets the APA requirement by invoking the novelty
and nonobviousness grounds on which the Patent Office is
supposed to evaluate petitions for inter partes review. Whatever
the correct answer is, it is by no means clear-cut. The murky line
between testing whether the Patent Office stated the grounds for its
decision (which is what § 555(e) of the APA is for) and reviewing
the Patent Office’s rationale for making a non-institution decision
(which is prohibited by the Patent Act’s § 314(d)) might cause
a court to avoid the question entirely. The court might
invoke § 314(d)’s bar on appealing the institution decision as
justification for refusing to compel the Agency to provide the
statement of explanation.
An adequate statement should explain—even if briefly—the
Patent Office’s actual rationale for denying a petition for inter
partes review. The explanation should not be merely conclusory
but should include analysis that touches on why the grounds for
review sought by the petitioner are not merited. This would satisfy
the purpose of § 555(e) of the APA.
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VI. CONCLUSION
When the United States Patent and Trademark Office denies a
petition for inter partes review, the petitioner has a legal right to a
brief explanation for the denial. This right stems from § 555(e) of
the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires agencies to
provide a brief statement of the grounds for denying a petition.
While judicial review of the Patent Office’s decision to deny a
petition is itself unavailable, the Patent Act does not remove the
APA’s requirement that the Agency provide a brief explanation.
Because a petitioner for inter partes review has a legal right to
a brief explanation when the Patent Office denies the petition, the
petitioner should also have a legal remedy. Whether the most likely
remedy is a suit in district court or an appeal at the Federal Circuit,
courts should not deny the remedy under the pretense that it is
barred by the Patent Act. There is a distinction between the noninstitution decision, which cannot be reviewed, and a failure to
provide an explanation for the non-institution decision, which
would be contrary to the APA.
By requiring the Patent Office to give brief explanations when
denying petitions for inter partes review, the APA ensures that the
Office gives thoughtful consideration to its decisions. Furthermore,
such explanations help to advance patent law’s development into a
more coherent and better understood body of law. Last, these
explanations help petitioners improve their petitions to more
effectively raise meritorious grounds for inter partes review, while
omitting tenuous grounds, thus saving the patent owner the
trouble of fighting petitions that have a low chance of success but
nevertheless require attention in an adversarial process.
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